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ESSAY 
HELPLESS GIANTS?  THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE’S 
ABILITY TO INFLUENCE AND MANAGE EXTERNAL 
THREATS TO REDWOOD NATIONAL AND STATE 
PARKS 
Jack McLeod* 
INTRODUCTION 
National parks in the United States exist for two related yet opposed purposes: 
to preserve areas of national or scenic importance, and to provide for the enjoyment 
of said areas by the public.
1
  The federal government tasked the National Park 
Service (NPS) with numerous tools to supervise interior park areas.
2
  A focus on 
preservation solely within park boundaries, however, would spell doom for these 
American treasures.  Externalities threaten scenic values for nearly every national 
park in the United States; more than half of the major threats to national parks begin 
outside their walls,
3
 “threatening to engulf [the parks], causing increasingly severe 
damage within the parks to the values and resources which they were set aside to 
preserve.”4  Since “few national parks encompass within their boundaries the entire 
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provision and copyright notice. 
 *  Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2018.  Thank you to 
Professor John Nagle for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay and for providing 
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 1 See 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014). 
 2 See id. § 200103. 
 3 William J. Lockhart, External Threats to Our National Parks: An Argument for 
Substantive Protection, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 40 (1997). 
 4 Id. at 41; see also James E. Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 
ALA. L. REV. 417, 456 (2005) (“[T]he ‘external threats’ to wilderness areas are a constant reminder 
of how connected landscapes remain in the face of legal constructs.”); Joseph L. Sax, Buying 
Scenery: Land Acquisitions for the National Park Service, 1980 DUKE L.J. 709. 
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ecosystems necessary to maintain natural balance,”5 these problems will persist 
indefinitely if not halted. 
Unfortunately, the NPS has presented a mixed response to external threats.  Its 
alleged failure to meaningfully stem the tide of external threats to scenic resources 
has resulted in many commentators proclaiming it unable to protect its landmarks.  
Professor Joseph Sax argued that “[f]ull protection of the parks from incompatible 
[external] development is . . . plainly impracticable.”6  The NPS itself has claimed 
that it possesses “no direct regulatory authority to ensure that park resources are not 
harmed by projects outside of its borders,”7 while others believe that the NPS “is 
generally unable to regulate or to control effectively activities or developments 
originating on federal, state or private lands located outside park boundaries.”8  
Therefore, though threats to national parks inside their walls remain important, the 
“more vexing questions are usually whether . . . Congress has delegated authority to 
the federal land managing agency to abate the threats from non-federal 
development—and if so, whether the agency has the will to exercise it.”9 
Rarely is this problem so acute as in Redwood National and State Parks 
(RNSP).  Redwood National Park sits adjacent to state and private land, which both 
impact federal redwood trees.  Moreover, “[a]s a result of a political compromise 
struck by the Ninetieth Congress, the boundaries of the Redwood National Park did 
not reflect the ecological realities . . . of the redwood forests.”10  Like other parks, 
RNSP therefore lies at the mercy of external actors. 
Much remains to be lost if external threats prevail over the redwood’s ancient 
beauty.  President Reagan once said that “[a] tree is a tree.  How many more do you 
have to look at?” when considering a Redwood National Park proposal.11  With all 
due respect to President Reagan, redwood trees exemplify some of the most scenic 
forests in the world.  RNSP preserves “the largest remaining contiguous section of 
 
 5 THE CONSERVATION FOUND., NATIONAL PARKS FOR A NEW GENERATION: VISIONS, 
REALITIES, PROSPECTS 126 (1985). 
 6 Sax, supra note 4, at 712. 
 7 Lockhart, supra note 3, at 4 (quoting Letter from Robert Barbee, Superintendent, 
Yellowstone Nat’l Park, to Mike DaSilva, Coordinator of the Envtl. Impact Statement on the New 
World Project proposal by Crown Butte Mines, Inc., Mont. Dep’t of State Lands 4 (Dec. 17, 1993) 
(on file with the Stanford Environmental Law Journal). 
 8 Robert B. Keiter, On Protecting the National Parks from the External Threats Dilemma, 
20 U. WYO. LAND & WATER L. REV. 355, 356 (1985). 
 9 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 
1081–82 (6th ed. 2007). 
 10 Dale A. Hudson, Sierra Club v. Department of Interior: The Fight to Preserve the 
Redwood National Park, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 781, 781 (1978). 
 11 Carl Pope, If You’ve Seen One Redwood, You’ve Seen Them All—Not!, HUFFINGTON POST 
(July 12, 2006, 5:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-pope/if-youve-seen-one-
redwood_b_24927.html. 
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ancient coast redwood forest . . . [and] some of the world’s tallest and oldest trees.”12  
The trees “humble[]”13 those who walk among them, 
with their ponderous strength, reaching toward the sky like pillars of a temple.  
With the mystic beauty and stately magnitude of the sun-filtered towering forms, 
the almost infinite variety of light and shade and color, and the unfolding life and 
beauty of the forest, the big redwoods are not looked at; they are experienced . . . . 
An awe-inspiring element of time pervades these living relics . . . .
14
 
Their scenic beauty, however, remains imperiled today by external threats.  
Despite attempts to reduce logging, “[t]here are still ancient redwoods slated for 
cutting that need to be protected.”15 
This Essay analyzes the interactions between federal, state, and private 
landowners regarding RNSP to determine what power the NPS has to stop the 
destruction of its trees resulting from externalities.  Part I briefly discusses the 
historical development of RNSP, focusing on how its boundaries impact inner scenic 
resources.  Part II argues that California state efforts have traditionally hampered 
redwood protection in RNSP, and Part III examines the limited resources the NPS 
possesses to protect redwoods.  Ultimately, the NPS has few effective tools at its 
disposal to protect redwoods against external threats, except nuisance litigation.  If 
the NPS cannot successfully influence external forces, national parks—and 
redwoods themselves—will truly become “helpless giants.”16 
I.     THE HISTORY OF EXTERNAL THREATS TO RNSP 
No matter whether the redwoods represent helpless giants today, they certainly 
held that title in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Eager to exploit their 
economic potential, private loggers had purchased thousands of acres of redwood 
lands in California by 1879—nearly all available redwood growths.17  By 1900, 
logging became “the most important industry in California.”18  Activists scored early 
victories against loggers in the 1920s, when they first began purchasing redwood 
land from loggers.  In 1921, the Save the Redwoods League convinced the California 
legislature to buy land along the Redwood Highway for $300,000, negotiating with 
 
 12 NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GENERAL MANAGEMENT 
PLAN/GENERAL PLAN: REDWOOD NATIONAL AND STATE PARKS, HUMBOLDT AND DEL NORTE 
COUNTIES, CALIFORNIA 12 (2000). 
 13 Hudson, supra note 10, at 784 (quoting Bonnie Newton, Heritage of the World: The 
Eternal Redwoods, NAT’L PARKS & CONSERVATION MAG., Sept. 1973, at 20). 
 14 Id. (quoting Newton, supra note 13, at 18, 20–21). 
 15 About Redwoods, SAVE THE REDWOODS LEAGUE, 
https://www.savetheredwoods.org/redwoods/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2018) [hereinafter About 
Redwoods]. 
 16 Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 
75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 241 (1976). 
 17 DARREN FREDERICK SPEECE, DEFENDING GIANTS: THE REDWOOD WARS AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 45 (2017); League Milestones, 
SAVE THE REDWOODS LEAGUE, https://www.savetheredwoods.org/about-us/mission-
history/league-milestones/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
 18 Hudson, supra note 10, at 789. 
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one of the most powerful loggers, Pacific Lumber, in the process.
19
  By 1964, the 
Save the Redwoods League had negotiated with logging companies to help 
California acquire 102,000 acres of redwoods in areas they later transferred to states, 
today called Del Norte Coast and Jedediah Smith Redwoods State Parks.
20
 
Largely due to the success activists enjoyed in countering powerful logging 
companies, legislative interest in protecting other redwoods declined; the activists 
had already “saved” the trees.21  Activists continued to battle loggers until 1968, 
when Congress passed the bill creating Redwood National Park.
22
  The Act, 
however, did not adequately protect redwoods; it “was the culmination of a four-
year political struggle and represented a compromise between several competing 
interest groups.”23 
Since its proponents navigated various competing and uncooperative interests, 
“park boundaries were tailored to meet political needs instead of ecological realities, 
[and] the drafters anticipated that problems would be encountered in . . . protecting 
the park.”24  The final Redwood National Park Act failed to include key watersheds, 
but did contain three state parks (Prairie Creek, Jedediah Smith, and Del Norte 
Coast).
25
  From the onset, park boundaries did not represent conservation but 
politics, arbitrarily designed not to protect redwoods but to protect a smorgasbord of 
conflicting interests.  The Act did not leave the NPS helpless to defend the redwoods, 
however.  It delegated to the Secretary of Interior the power to modify park 
boundaries and acquire nearby land to assure external threats did not harm park 
resources.
26
 
Logging operations outside Redwood National Park created many risks to trees 
under NPS protection.  Logging companies built numerous roads to transport fallen 
trees.
27
  Constructing these roads exposed slopes and made the surrounding area 
more susceptible to erosion.
28
  Even normal logging operations disturbed the soil’s 
natural vegetative cover and drainage routes.
29
  These developments caused eroded 
sediment to wash into Redwood Creek, which flowed directly into RNSP.
30
  As 
streambeds inside RNSP eroded, they carried away soil that redwoods needed to 
stand upright.
31
  Not only would wind more easily topple redwoods, but erosion of 
streambeds caused moisture to leave with the soil, depriving trees of oxygen in the 
 
 19 SPEECE, supra note 17, at 51. 
 20 Hudson, supra note 10, at 790; see also EDWIN C. BEARSS, REDWOOD NATIONAL PARK: 
HISTORY BASIC DATA ch. XIV (1969). 
 21 Hudson, supra note 10, at 790. 
 22 Redwood National Park Act, Pub. L. No. 90-545, 82 Stat. 931 (1968). 
 23 Hudson, supra note 10, at 794.  These struggles can be traced to many sources, such as 
political delays and financial restraints from the Vietnam War, coupled with internal discord among 
conservation groups over which redwood basins to protect.  See id. at 794–97. 
 24 Id. at 794. 
 25 Id. at 798, 803; see Redwood National Park, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 15, 2015), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/national-parks/redwood-national-park/. 
 26 Hudson, supra note 10, at 803. 
 27 See NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 12, at 19. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Hudson, supra note 10, at 786–87. 
 30 NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 12, at 19–20. 
 31 Id. at 19. 
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water.
32
  Additionally, other external threats, like air and water pollution as well as 
human development, threatened redwoods in the 1970s and 1980s,
33
 and continue 
today.
34
 
These external threats directly impacted scenic experiences for hikers within 
RNSP.  Hikers frequently saw clear-cut space just beyond park boundaries, causing 
the “visual character of Redwood Creek’s alluvial plain [to be] . . . modified by 
deposition of sawed logs, battered culverts and logging cables. . . . Pools have been 
filled and sculptured logs and streamside vegetation buried by fine gravel.”35  
External threats thereby caused “obvious aesthetic damage”36 to the park.  Clearly, 
the boundaries established by the 1968 Act could not remain.  “Continued timber 
harvesting on the excluded land was so harmful to the park that ten years later 
Congress added 48,000 acres to the park at a cost that may reach half a billion 
dollars.”37  That congressional action was the Redwood National Park Expansion 
Act of 1978.
38
 
House Representative Phillip Burton sponsored the Redwood National Park 
Expansion Act to correct the wrongs of the initial 1968 Act.  In his opening remarks, 
he emphasized that logging and water damage on nearby lands jeopardized the 
“durab[ility]” of Redwood National Park.39  He noted that due to boundary 
inefficiencies, the Department of Interior had not stemmed the tide of external 
threats, or was unwilling to do so.
40
  He cited numerous reports showing the need 
for protection against actions originating outside the Park,
41
 and stated that the 
“[c]learcut logging on privately owned lands adjacent . . . continues to cause 
substantial, and perhaps irreparable, damage to . . . esthetics.”42  Scenic impairment 
from external threats therefore occupied a central focus in the Park’s expansion. 
The legislative history of the Expansion Act also addressed the authority of the 
Department of Interior to impact areas external to RNSP.  The House Committee on 
the Interior and Insular Affairs stated that, without additional authority, the Interior’s 
“ability to adopt fair and effective cooperative agreements and contracts is totally 
 
 32 Id.; see also Hudson, supra note 10, at 786–87. 
 33 RICHARD WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY 
ch. 6 (1997); see Steve Norman, Fire and Forest Fragmentation, COAST REDWOOD ECOLOGY & 
MGMT., https://redwood.forestthreats.org/fragmentation.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2018) (“As the 
human population expands within the coast redwood range, the margins of some privately held 
second growth experience economic pressure to be subdivided for homes.  This brings the wildland-
urban interface closer to park boundaries.”). 
 34 See About Redwoods, supra note 15 (discussing how pollution and climate change cause 
uncertainty for the future of redwoods). 
 35 Hudson, supra note 10, at 842 (quoting Richard J. Janda, Recent Man-Induced 
Modifications of the Physical Resources of the Redwood Creek Unit of Redwood National Park, 
California, and the Processes Responsible for Those Modifications 3–4 (U.S. Geological Survey, 
Open-File Report Ser. No. 75-561, 1975)). 
 36 Id. at 806. 
 37 Sax, supra note 4, at 712. 
 38 Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163 (1978). 
 39 121 CONG. REC. 11,347 (1975) (statement of Rep. Burton). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 123 CONG. REC. 4,965 (1977) (statement of Rep. Burton). 
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dependent upon the attitudes of the concerned companies.”43  The Committee thus 
proposed that the amendment permit “the rehabilitation of areas within and upstream 
from the park; to authorize the adoption of regulations, after consultation with the 
State of California and a finding that the existing State regulations are inadequate”44 
to give NPS actions teeth outside park boundaries.  The final bill, however, did not 
include these provisions; the Interior could rehabilitate areas only after contracting 
with the state government, and the final bill excluded independent Interior regulatory 
authority.
45
 
RNSP faces other external threats today that have yet to be resolved.  A 
highway expansion plan along RNSP borders would eliminate fifty-four redwood 
trees, while placing human development even closer to park boundaries.
46
  In 2016, 
California’s Board of Forestry approved logging of 402 acres of redwood forest in 
the lower Gualala River.
47
  Though California courts ordered the Board to revise its 
timber harvest plan for the Gualala River, timber companies may later revise it.
48
  
Approval of such plans, though far from RNSP, “could set a precedent for granting 
future logging efforts in sensitive habitats statewide.”49  Finally, as President Donald 
Trump proposed to reduce the Interior’s budget by $1.6 billion,50 an already-
strapped NPS reduced its workforce in “nearly 90 percent of parks” and received 
“23 percent fewer resources to fund the highest-priority resource management 
 
 43 AMENDING THE ACT OF OCTOBER 2, 1968, AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A REDWOOD 
NATIONAL PARK IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. DOC. NO. 95-
581, at 25 (95th Sess. 1977).  The Committee also cited Secretary of the Interior Andrus, who said 
that park expansion remains unnecessary so long as the timber activities are regulated by California 
with NPS guidance.  Id.  Thus, NPS actors preferred cooperation with state governments and 
loggers to NPS action. 
 44 Id. (emphasis added). 
 45 Redwood National Park Expansion Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163, 165.  
Why the final bill did not include these protections is not clear based on the legislative record. 
 46 Jamie Henn, Is California Still Cutting Down Redwood Trees?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 
12, 2011, 10:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jamie-henn/is-california-still-
cutti_b_1008161.html.  The highway plan would also disrupt the roots of sixty-six additional trees.  
Id. 
 47 Peter Baye & Rick Coates, Notice of Intent to Sue CAL FIRE Over Approval of 
Controversial Gualala River Floodplain Redwood Logging—“Dogwood” Timber Harvest Plan, 
Sonoma County, FRIENDS OF GUALALA RIVER (July 11, 2016), 
http://gualalariver.org/forestry/floodplain-logging/notice-intent-sue-cal-fire-approval-
controversial-gualala-river-floodplain-redwood-logging-dogwood-timber-harvest-plan-sonoma-
county/. 
 48 See Frank Robertson, Environmentalists Get Attorneys’ Fees for Halting Gualala 
Logging, CLOVERDALE REVEILLE (July 5, 2017), 
http://www.sonomawest.com/cloverdale_reveille/news/environmentalists-get-attorneys-fees-for-
halting-gualala-logging/article_64a7b954-61c3-11e7-837a-5bb41ca981d5.html. 
 49 Taylor Hill, A Plan to Log Century-Old Redwoods Could Set a Bad Precedent, TAKEPART 
(July 15, 2016), http://www.takepart.com/article/2016/07/15/redwood-century-old-logging-
approved. 
 50 Devin Henry, Lawmakers Take Aim at Trump’s Interior Budget, THE HILL (June 8, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/336944-lawmakers-take-aim-at-trumps-interior-
budget. 
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projects . . . including . . . mitigation of threats.”51  Without the necessary funds to 
acquire land or manage external threats, RNSP remains at risk for future harm. 
When the NPS assumed joint control with California over RNSP in 1994,
52
 it 
did so with little regulatory authority to impact external threats.  The NPS still had 
some allies in protecting the redwoods, however.  NPS’s partner, California, 
previously established state schemes to defend against private logging.
53
  If these 
ventures succeeded, the NPS’s apparent lack of authority would, effectively, be 
irrelevant. 
II.     STATE RESPONSES TO REDWOOD THREATS 
The NPS itself believed that cooperation with states—or independent state 
regulation itself—provided the first line of defense against external threats to 
RNSP.
54
  Thus, when Congress first purchased Redwood National Park from private 
landowners, it began “a long collaboration between the state and federal 
governments regarding redwood parks.”55  Conflicts between the preservation goals 
of the federal and state bodies persisted, however.  Since development on private 
lands is “ordinarily governed only by state law and local zoning codes,”56 if private 
lands produce threats to nearby RNSP lands, the NPS could stand at the mercy of 
California regulations.  The NPS recognized this, stating that active participation in 
state and local land use decisions represented an important method to influence 
decisions outside park boundaries.
57
  However, local land use bodies normally 
succumb to pressure from private landowners who would impose far less strict 
regulations than the NPS would prefer.
58
  Thus far, the NPS has occasionally worked 
 
 51 NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION: FISCAL YEAR 2018, at Overview-3, Overview-23 (2017), 
https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/upload/FY-2018-NPS-Greenbook.pdf. 
 52 Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/redw/faqs.htm 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
 53 See generally Thomas Lundmark, Regulation of Private Logging in California, 5 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 139 (1975). 
 54 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 55 SPEECE, supra note 17, at 74; see Michael Mantell, The National Park System and 
Development on Private Lands: Opportunities and Tools to Protect Park Resources, in EXTERNAL 
DEVELOPMENT AFFECTING THE NATIONAL PARKS: PRESERVING “THE BEST IDEA WE EVER HAD” 
1, 2 (1986) (“[T]he most important opportunities to protect National Park resources from the 
adverse effects of development on private lands may lie less in the application of various legal 
doctrines and more in a variety of cooperative mechanisms that involve local governments . . . .”). 
 56 George Cameron Coggins, Protecting the Wildlife Resources of National Parks from 
External Threats, 22 U. WYO. LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 6 (1987); see also Darren Speece, From 
Corporatism to Citizen Oversight: The Legal Fight over California Redwoods, 1970–1996, 14 
ENVTL. HIST. 705, 716 (2009) (noting that forestry operations were generally “governed at the state 
level”). 
 57 See NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 12, at 36; Mantell, supra note 55, at 27 (“Local 
constituency building on the part of park staff can be an important response to external pressures.”).  
To date, however, there have been few, if any, conflicts with local planning authorities that have 
resulted in litigation. 
 58 Sax, supra note 4, at 710; see infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text for a more detailed 
discussion of local cooperation. 
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with localities in the redwoods, but little documentation exists of such interactions; 
it has relied more expressly on state authorities to regulate externalities. 
For most of the twentieth century, the NPS could do little but watch as the 
California Department of Forestry’s Board of Forestry (CDF), a state body 
overseeing private timber plans, eviscerated protections against logging on lands 
adjacent to federal and state redwood parks.  The CDF included timber 
representatives in its decision-making process, ostensibly to improve the 
effectiveness of its directives by allowing those regulated—who know the most 
about their industry—to have a say.59  Predictably, the inclusion of loggers on a 
board with dueling objectives to promote development and prevent environmental 
harm favored the former goal.  “[T]he Board was more committed to its economic 
development goals than it was to its conservation mission.”60  People “pecuniarily 
interested in the timber industry”61 therefore promulgated CDF decisions.62  The 
CDF continued harming the interests of Californian redwoods until local citizens 
and activists began to sue. 
Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors
63
 represented “the first successful 
attack on the Board’s independence.”64  There, a local county board challenged the 
CDF’s granting of harvesting permits to Bayside Timber.65  The appellate court 
found that the CDF’s membership consisted almost entirely of timber companies 
and land owners, each having an interest in exploiting redwoods for monetary gain.
66
  
Since these private parties faced “no [legislative] guides or standards to prevent . . . 
abuse,”67 they had “uncontrolled discretion”68 in choosing to protect—or not 
protect—redwoods.  As a result, the court held the CDF’s enabling legislation, the 
Forest Practice Act, to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
69
 
Today, the CDF still faces challenges from citizens and localities.  In Sierra 
Club v. State Board of Forestry, the California Supreme Court noted the significant 
judicial deference given to CDF decisions, requiring prejudice to overturn CDF 
decisions.
70
  Yet, this deference can be overcome.  The California Supreme Court 
held that the CDF violated California environmental law by approving a timber plan 
without examining any information about the plan’s impact on wildlife.71  Though 
courts owed the CDF deference, it could not engage in a merely cursory analysis of 
 
 59 See Speece, supra note 56, at 707. 
 60 Id. at 710. 
 61 Bayside Timber Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 97 Cal. Rptr. 431, 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). 
 62 See Speece, supra note 56, at 711. 
 63 97 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Cal Ct. App. 1971). 
 64 See Speece, supra note 56, at 712. 
 65 Bayside Timber Co., 97 Cal. Rptr. at 432. 
 66 Id. at 435–36. 
 67 Id. at 437. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 438–40.  California later passed an updated Forest Practice Act in response in 1973.  
See Forest Practice, CAL FIRE, http://calfire.ca.gov/resource_mgt/resource_mgt_forestpractice 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
 70 876 P.2d 505, 518 (Cal. 1994). 
 71 Id. at 519; see also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 50 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (declining to defer to CDF decision when it did not act according 
to its authorized power). 
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harvest plans.  Even with the CDF’s reliance on timber representatives mitigated 
after Bayside, it still largely deferred to timber plans,
72
 calling into question its 
ability to reliably protect land outside RNSP. 
This deference to timber plans has continued to alarming levels.  For example, 
in EPIC v. California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, the court analyzed 
a Sustained Yield Plan (SYP) from Pacific Lumber.
73
  Though the court largely 
upheld the Board’s approval of the SYP, it chastised the CDF for its close 
relationship with loggers.  The CDF had delegated to Pacific Lumber the job of 
revising parts of the SYP and consolidating documents into the agency’s final plan, 
tasks within the CDF’s exclusive control.74  Like in Sierra Club v. State Board of 
Forestry, the CDF excessively deferred to a timber company’s plan.75  The plan 
approved by the CDF also contained insufficient information about the area to be 
harvested.
76
  The CDF must engage in more detailed discussions about 
environmental impacts,
77
 no matter whether the effects of logging “may be expected 
to fall on or off the logging site.”78  The Board, therefore, despite repeated court 
decisions to the contrary, tends to side with questionable timber company plans, 
failing to accurately consider their environmental impacts. 
If the CDF can simply “rubber-stamp[]”79 timber companies’ harvest plans, 
and private lands remain principally governed by state law, then the NPS may need 
its own regulatory authority to protect internal redwoods.  To be sure, the above 
cases demonstrate that the CDF’s unilateral and unbridled authority to approve 
logging plans has diminished over time, “forc[ing] the Board of Forestry to back 
away from its traditional alliance with the timber industry.”80  Yet, continued 
litigation against the CDF in the twenty-first century indicates it still fails to consider 
many external effects of timber plan approvals, court orders notwithstanding. 
What, then, can the NPS do to protect itself from inevitable externalities that 
harm internal scenic resources?  As noted above, the NPS can attempt to cooperate 
with local and state governments to influence their decision-making processes.
81
  Yet 
 
 72 Even today, the CDF rarely hesitates to grant harvesting rights to timber companies.  See, 
e.g., Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 73 187 P.3d 888 (Cal. 2008). 
 74 Id. at 911. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 916–17.  California courts have held that if the CDF encounters evidence of damage 
logging would do to the surrounding areas—such as academic papers or reports—the CDF must 
engage in cumulative impact analysis for environmental damage elsewhere.  See, e.g., Friends of 
the Old Trees v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297, 308–10 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997). 
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cooperation, while useful in theory, provides little—if any—ability for the NPS to 
meaningfully prevent external threats to RNSP.  First, to the extent cooperation 
would occur with state entities, the CDF would continue to play a prominent and 
problematic role; cooperation with an agency with a track record of failure to protect 
redwoods seems undesirable.  Even when the NPS cooperated with the CDF in 1973, 
“over the objections of the National Park Service, the Board ruled that clear-cutting 
in the Redwood Creek watershed did not harm”82 the Park and approved harmful 
harvest plans.  Moreover, on private lands upstream of RNSP, the CDF allows 
private landowners to determine if they want the NPS to participate in preventative 
measures like inspections—allowing their conflicts of interest to impair NPS 
investigations.
83
 
Second, the NPS still has no power to direct local or state authorities to enact 
the regulations it wants.  Historically, “the prospects for . . . abating [external] 
threats through intergovernmental cooperation alone [have been] bleak”84 because 
NPS influence over other governments “is purely advisory and often ignored.”85  The 
importance of NPS’s purely advisory authority becomes magnified when the 
localities with which it wishes to cooperate “ordinarily are satisfied with fewer 
restrictions than the Park Service wants, because preservation is not their mission.”86 
Therefore, though cooperation with local and state governments offers 
promise, it can at best produce helpful but inferior ways for the NPS to influence 
external threats.  State agencies like the CDF have proven ineffective at protecting 
redwoods whose logging produces harmful effects on RNSP lands.  The NPS must 
rely on its own authority to solve external threats. 
III.     THE NPS’S ABILITY TO MANAGE EXTERNAL THREATS 
Many commentators have vigorously debated whether the NPS possesses the 
authority to regulate outside park boundaries.  Some argue that the NPS does not 
have such authority.
87
  They claim the Organic Act at best gives the NPS power over 
federal lands, not private or state lands.
88
  On the other hand, many supporters of 
increased NPS regulatory authority have contended that, even with ambiguous 
Organic Act language, national parks can issue regulations covering external threats.  
Under Section 1 of the Organic Act, the NPS must regulate the “use” of national 
parks.
89
  Since common park experiences like hiking rely on vistas that can reach 
outside parks, some argue that the “use” the NPS can regulate includes outside 
 
 82 Speece, supra note 56, at 714. 
 83 NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 12, at 23. 
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areas.
90
  Additionally, under the Redwoods Amendments
91
 they claim Congress 
evinced an intent for the NPS to become more involved in protecting against external 
threats.
92
  The inability to conclusively resolve this debate has resulted in much 
uncertainty among academics and government officials alike.
93
 
Regardless of whether the NPS has this authority, however, currently the 
willpower and mechanisms to satisfy a duty to regulate against external threats do 
not exist in the NPS.  By examining the trio of Sierra Club cases from the mid-
1970s, it becomes demonstrably clear that even if a duty to regulate against external 
threats applies to RNSP, the NPS faces difficulty, in its current form, fulfilling that 
duty. 
A.   The Sierra Club Litigation and the Failure of the NPS Response 
In Sierra Club v. Department of Interior (Sierra Club I), the activist Sierra 
Club sued the Interior to force it to protect RNSP from damage by logging operations 
on peripheral privately owned lands.
94
  The district court held that the Redwood 
National Park Act “impose[s] a legal duty on the Secretary to utilize the specific 
powers given to him whenever reasonably necessary for the protection of the park”95 
and that “any discretion vested in the Secretary concerning time, place and specifics 
of the exercise of such powers is subordinate to his paramount legal duty . . . to 
protect the park.”96  The court’s reference to the “place” of Secretary powers, then 
to the legislative history of the Act (including a congressional intent for the NPS to 
address externalities),
97
 shows a desire to apply this regulatory duty to external 
threats.  The importance of Sierra Club I cannot be overstated: “Sierra Club I is the 
first reported case to hold that this trust relationship creates a judicially enforceable 
duty to protect a national park from threatened injury”98—and it happened to occur 
for RNSP. 
The Sierra Club remained unsatisfied with the NPS’s responses to external 
loggings after Sierra Club I, so it sued again in 1975, claiming that logging continued 
to occur and the Secretary of Interior had failed “to discharge his statutory and 
fiduciary duty [established under Sierra Club I] to protect Redwood National Park 
from damage caused by logging operations on privately owned lands immediately 
adjacent to . . . the Park.”99  The court began Sierra Club II by noting that the 
Redwood National Park enabling legislation “expressly vested the Secretary with 
authority to take certain specifically stated steps designed to protect the Park from 
 
 90 See Lockhart, supra note 3, at 62; James J. Vinch, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
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 92 See Lockhart, supra note 3, at 61, 65–67; Vinch, supra note 90, at 124. 
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 94 Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior (Sierra Club I), 376 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
 95 Id. at 95. 
 96 Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
 97 Id. at 94 n.3. 
 98 Hudson, supra note 10, at 815. 
 99 Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior (Sierra Club II), 398 F. Supp. 284, 285 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
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damage caused by logging operations on the surrounding privately owned lands.”100  
These steps included three explicit measures: modification of boundaries, 
acquisition of interests in land or cooperative agreements with peripheral 
landowners, and acquisition of land near the highway.
101
  Since RNSP boundaries 
authorized by Congress “represented a compromise and did not include” important 
areas just outside the Park,
102
 the Secretary had a duty to ensure those areas did not 
jeopardize NPS lands.
103
 
Here, the Secretary failed to fulfill his duties by ignoring multiple reports that 
showed logging upstream caused detrimental effects in Redwood National Park.  He 
knew of, and then summarily disregarded, at least four reports—two from the 
Interior itself—that recommended the Interior take immediate action to create buffer 
zones, prevent adjacent logging, acquire land, and cooperate with companies.
104
  The 
court commanded the Secretary to acquire land interests, contract with peripheral 
landowners, modify park boundaries, ask Congress for funds, and give the Sierra 
Club a progress report on its compliance with the court order.
105
  For the first time, 
a court gave specific orders for the Interior to meet a duty to prevent external park 
threats. 
The Interior’s response to this order and the Northern District of California’s 
third foray into the Sierra Club litigation evince the prohibitive difficulty in meeting 
the court’s terms.  The Interior attempted multiple solutions to external threats and 
each failed.  It first attempted to cooperate with the CDF.
106
  The Interior mistakenly 
relied on CDF regulation to solve the problem “without inquiring into the adequacy 
of state restrictions.”107  In a striking example of the failure of cooperation between 
state and federal agencies, the NPS presented a formal report to the CDF explaining 
the damage to the Park from state–approved timber harvests, and recommended 
restrictions on private actors.
108
  The CDF rejected all proposed restrictions.
109
  In a 
similarly futile effort to cooperate with timber companies, they rejected Interior 
guidelines for adjacent lands, instead choosing to self-regulate.
110
 
The Interior considered acquiring land threatening the Park, but it could not 
secure the funds.  The cost would rise to a prohibitive ceiling of $500 million, and 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) rejected an Interior proposal for a 
$15 million buffer zone purchase.
111
  When the Interior boldly requested the OMB 
 
 100 Id. at 286. 
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draft legislation granting “new additional regulatory power over peripheral timber 
operations,” the OMB denied the request.112 
Therefore, in a convincing defeat of Interior efforts, “all federal, state, and 
private entities involved with the problem refused to assist the NPS in meeting the 
terms of the court’s original order.”113  Clearly, it is one issue whether the NPS in 
fact has a duty to regulate or influence external actors; it is another issue entirely 
whether compliance with that duty remains feasible.  The Sierra Club III court 
concluded that further efforts to request funding or regulatory powers from the OMB 
“would be futile,”114 and since the Interior made a good-faith effort to comply with 
a seemingly insurmountable problem, it could not be held liable.
115
  Thus, current 
mechanisms to combat external threats to redwoods will likely fail. 
Other reasons exist explaining why the NPS, as it currently stands, cannot 
adequately protect RNSP from external threats.  First, NPS “reticence toward 
exercising authority outside park boundaries has been pronounced and long-
standing.”116  Its response to Sierra Club II notwithstanding, the NPS has historically 
lacked the willingness to expand its reach outside its borders.  The NPS itself 
believes it needs additional authority to regulate outside its borders.
117
  It has stated 
that the external threats problem “would have to be solved in the political 
process,”118 not with NPS action.  This mentality may be due to concerns over NPS 
popularity; engaging in external regulation likely to produce tangible costs, like 
unemployment, for the abstract benefit of scenic parks could cause the NPS to be 
perceived as a “meddlesome neighbor.”119  Regardless, if the NPS remains unwilling 
to accept a larger role, then no amount of authority will protect RNSP. 
Second, Congress does not want to give the NPS additional regulatory power 
because it wishes to avoid intruding on traditional state and local property 
authority.
120
  Private landowners would “see themselves as . . . subservient to the 
federal lands”121 and Congress would not want to create federalism concerns. 
Third, the NPS’s major tools for protecting inner scenic resources—land 
acquisition and boundary modification—prove too expensive and cause more 
headaches than they are worth.  Land acquisition, as noted above, remains highly 
expensive, which—for RNSP—would already add to “the most expensive national 
park in history.”122  But more fundamentally, boundary problems will persist so long 
as boundaries exist.  Acquiring land or modifying boundaries changes little, for 
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“[o]ne can move the situs of the problem by acquisition, but the problem itself will 
remain.”123  Moving the boundaries, short of buying every redwood tree in the 
Northwest, only creates new neighbors with equally significant private interests that 
will conflict with NPS goals.  Therefore, while attractive, acquisition fails as a future 
strategy for RNSP. 
B.   Nuisance Suits as a Solution 
One option remains for the NPS: instigation of a nuisance suit against adjacent 
landowners.  Since external actions cause the enjoyment of RNSP to decline—by 
directly affecting the well-being of RNSP trees—the government could prove a 
prima facie case.
124
  Nuisance suits would be particularly apt for loss of scenic value, 
since development and pollution cause “visitors [to be] less able to find a serene 
setting in which to . . . enjoy nature.”125  Even lawful uses of land can become 
nuisances; CDF approval would not save private logging.
126
  Since the federal 
government enjoys the right, on behalf of the NPS, to sue for nuisance like any 
private landowner,
127
 the government may succeed in bringing a claim. 
Before analyzing the possibility of a successful nuisance suit we must first 
establish the types of nuisance suits the government could bring.  First, the federal 
government could bring a public nuisance claim against entities harming their parks 
or monuments from outside their borders.  A public nuisance “is an unreasonable 
interference with a right common to the general public.”128  The Restatement broadly 
defines unreasonable interferences, including conduct that could involve a 
significant interference with “the public comfort or the public convenience.”129  In 
establishing national parks the government sought to preserve areas of national and 
scenic importance and allow the public to enjoy those lands.
130
  Preservation of 
scenic areas is a right shared by all citizens because the government (and many vocal 
citizens) have judged these areas vital to American culture and recreation.  The 
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ability to visit these areas shines as an example of a public right.  If external threats 
destroy the very objects of their enjoyment (their scenery), the public’s “comfort” in 
visiting the areas declines, and the “convenience” of enjoying areas of aesthetic 
beauty lessens. 
The Restatement provides the following example of a public nuisance: “If, 
however, the pollution [of a stream] . . . kills the fish in a navigable stream and so 
deprives all members of the community of the right to fish, it becomes a public 
nuisance.”131  Like the fish in this stream, runoff from logging or other human 
development pollutes the water redwoods need to survive, depriving members of the 
public of their right to see these redwoods.  Dust or air pollution from nearby activity 
could similarly distort the redwoods’ habitat.  The harm to public rights is twofold: 
(1) the environmental damage to rare species like redwoods and their habitat, and 
(2) the aesthetic damage to beautiful (and protected) trees.  By interfering with those 
rights, external actors create a public nuisance. 
Second, the federal government, as owners of RNSP, could bring a private 
nuisance claim against loggers or other external actors.  “A private nuisance is a 
nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of 
land.”132  Courts have required that the invasion be unreasonable.133  To determine 
whether the conduct causes an unreasonable invasion of the landowner’s use and 
enjoyment of land, courts balance the harm of the defendant’s action against the 
utility of the challenged conduct.
134
  Factors contributing to the harm of the 
defendant’s action include: (1) extent of harm, (2) character of harm, (3) social value 
of plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the land, (4) suitability of plaintiff’s use to the 
locality, and (5) burden on plaintiff of avoiding the harm.
135
  Conversely, factors 
contributing to the utility of the challenged conduct include: (1) the social value of 
the conduct, (2) suitability of the conduct to the locale, and (3) the impracticability 
of avoiding the invasion.
136
 
The government, as a landowner of national parks or monuments, has two 
connected goals: protect areas of scenic, cultural, or recreational importance, and 
gain revenue from park activities.  The scenic value of landmarks—from redwood 
trees to geysers to mountaintops—lies at the heart of the importance, and 
profitability, of these locations; landmarks draw people to the parks.  Harming 
redwood trees both prevents the government from protecting the environment on its 
land and reduces the likelihood citizens will want to spend money to see them.  The 
historical manner of logging—by causing runoff to seep into streams redwoods use 
to survive—represents a form of water pollution long recognized as a quintessential 
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private nuisance.
137
  “Environmental nuisances often present the easiest [nuisance] 
cases” because their “injuries . . . are more tangible and more readily measured,”138 
including damage to property.  Erosion and runoff from logging has already caused 
significant damage to redwood trees in RNSP, while clearing trees near its 
boundaries creates unpleasant open spaces contrasted with dense redwood forests.
139
  
The harm to redwoods therefore remains a potent threat to the stunning giants, 
satisfying factors (1) and (2). 
Like many national parks, RNSP generates millions of dollars in revenue.  In 
2010 alone, an estimated 700,000 visitors spent $42 million in RNSP, generating 
hundreds of jobs.
140
  Aside from the satisfaction the federal government—and, by 
extension, its constituents—receive from protecting areas of scenic beauty, the 
tangible monetary benefits of RNSP remain high.  As Northern California remains 
an iconic area for redwoods, factors (3) and (4) are likely to be met. 
Finally, the NPS can hardly avoid the harm caused by external factors.  As 
noted above,
141
 the NPS possesses precious few tools to combat threats outside its 
borders.  Therefore, they can do little to avoid the harm (factor (5)). 
To be sure, the logging industry (and the other uses of residential and 
commercial lands near RNSP and national parks everywhere) has value of its own.  
Timber remains important to many fields, such as construction.  The Humboldt 
County timber industry creates revenues north of $440 million while creating over 
7000 jobs.
142
  Those numbers, however, include logging for all trees, not only 
redwoods; the contribution of redwoods is likely only a small percentage of those 
figures.  These numbers also include logging everywhere in Humboldt County, even 
those areas far from RNSP.  On the other hand, with fewer trees and less scenic 
hikes, viewer use and enjoyment of RNSP would certainly decline,
143
 substantially 
interfering with visitors’ experience.  Thus, both private and public nuisance suits 
would likely succeed and justify injunctive relief.
144
 
Despite this promise, the author’s attempt to comb Westlaw for a single 
nuisance case brought by the federal government concerning redwoods generated no 
results.  In general, “nuisance cases involving the federal government as plaintiff 
have been relatively scarce.”145  The federal government sued an aluminum plant 
whose emissions damaged trees and wildlife in Flathead National Forest and Glacier 
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National Park for trespass in 1979,
146
 but aside from that case, few examples exist 
of this tactic, making its likelihood of success difficult to judge.  Therefore, the tools 
for a federal nuisance suit exist, and its lack of use is due less to its apparent 
ineffectiveness than the NPS’s “failure to assert it.”147 
Three potential barriers to nuisance suits could challenge their effectiveness.  
First, “[t]raditionally, aesthetic complaints were insufficient to establish a 
nuisance.”148  For example, in Wernke v. Halas,149 the court found that a neighbor’s 
combination of ugly orange fencing and a toilet seat nailed to a tree (coupled with 
obscene language written in cement) did not constitute a nuisance because “it is well-
settled . . . that, standing alone, unsightliness, or lack of aesthetic virtue, does not 
constitute a private nuisance.”150  Yet, the case of national parks protecting against 
external threats is easily distinguished from these types of cases because (1) damage 
to redwoods, by constituting environmental harm, causes more than aesthetic harm, 
and (2) in most cases denying aesthetic nuisances, like Wernke, the aesthetic damage 
occurred on someone else’s property.  For RNSP here, the damage would be to 
tangible property on their own lands, forcing them to use and enjoy the land 
differently.  Moreover, other courts believe that aesthetic harm, especially if 
combined with other harm, can constitute a nuisance.
151
 
Second, when deciding whether to enjoin a defendant’s harmful conduct, 
courts consider the value of the defendant’s conduct.152  If the defendant’s external 
activity produces a great economic benefit, it could avoid injunctive relief.
153
  
Though the timber industry—and other external activities—do create some benefits, 
injunctive relief is still likely.  Injunctive relief for environmental damage in the 
nuisance context is “especially likely” due to “the enormous weight that is given to 
the preservation of our national resources and the protection of the environment from 
physical impairment.”154  In particular, for environmental damage creating 
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“irreparable harm,”155 there exists an even greater impetus for injunctive relief.  
Because damage to redwoods clearly constitutes environmental damage, and 
because the redwood tree’s imperiled position after years of logging makes 
irreparable harm from further loss more likely, a court will likely grant injunctive 
relief despite the clear economic benefit of timber. 
Finally, the nuisance approach offers only a piecemeal solution to the more 
structural problem of external threats.  The NPS would have to fight externalities on 
a case-by-case basis, which creates additional risk that conflicting or inappropriate 
results occur, while disabling it from affecting more fundamental change to the 
federal/nonfederal landowner relationship.
156
  By creating gaps between the desired 
result (no external threats) and reality, a case-by-case approach allows potentially 
harmful development to persist.
157
  On the other hand, it remains clear that nuisance 
suits, however imperfect, move the NPS one step closer to a more optimal response 
to external threats.  Moreover, sustained nuisance litigation success would likely 
deter external actors from continuing behavior that damages inner park resources, 
even though the NPS may not realistically sue all possible threats.  Therefore, the 
case-by-case approach should not dissuade the NPS from litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The above discussion paints a pessimistic view of how the NPS can respond to 
external threats to RNSP.  Though the NPS shares some blame—over-relying on 
cooperation with state and local entities while ignoring potential litigation 
solutions—the issue began with the initial Redwood National Park Act, which 
created a systemic mismatch between boundaries and threats to redwoods.  Given 
the historic failure of California state regulatory bodies, and the lack of authority, 
means, and willingness of the NPS to unilaterally regulate, redwoods largely still lie 
at the mercy of external actors.  Therefore, nuisance suits currently provide one of 
the only solutions to protect RNSP. 
Professor Sax may have been pessimistic when he argued that full protection 
of national parks from external threats is “plainly impracticable,”158 but he was not 
incorrect.  That does not mean, however, the NPS cannot improve its current 
position.  By focusing on nuisance litigation until it can convince Congress to 
expand its authority,
159
 the NPS can deter future harmful development while 
safeguarding current redwoods to the maximum extent possible.  Should the NPS 
take such a route, its historic redwood trees would not remain helpless giants. 
 
 155 Id. 
 156 See Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, Glacier National Park and Its Neighbors: A Study 
of Federal Interagency Relations, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 251–52 (1987); see also Sax, supra note 
16, at 260 (characterizing litigation as “only an interim remedy”). 
 157 See id. at 252. 
 158 Sax, supra note 4, at 712. 
 159 A daunting task of its own, given congressional misgivings about expanding federal 
regulatory power over property, a traditionally local concern.  See supra notes 120–121 and 
accompanying text. 
